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SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS IN BANKING
REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURER
ALFRED J.T. BYRNE*
MARTHA L. COULTER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal deposit insurance fund, administered by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), insures bank deposits against the
risk of bank insolvency.1 The primary purpose of federal deposit insur-
ance is to promote public confidence in the banking system. Banks play a
vital role in the nation's economy, providing credit, a safe place to store
and invest funds, and essential components of the payments system. In-
terruption of these functions through destabilization of the banking sys-
tem could cripple daily commercial activities.
The primary responsibility of the federal deposit insurer is to protect
the deposit insurance fund against undue risk. Although the insurer
must be concerned with the financial well-being of individual banks, it
also must identify and address threats to the stability and vitality of the
banking system as a whole.
There is a general consensus that the banking system is in need of
reform. In recent years, due to rapid and extensive changes in the finan-
cial services marketplace,2 commercial banks in the United States have
faced increasing competition from non-bank financial firms. Fettered by
* Mr. Byrne is General Counsel to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
** Ms. Coulter is a Counsel in the Regulation and Legislation Section of the FDIC's Legal
Division.
The views represented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the FDIC.
1. The FDIC administers both the Bank Insurance Fund, which insures deposits in commer-
cial banks and savings banks, and the Savings Association Insurance Fund, which insures deposits in
savings and loan associations and other thrift institutions. This Article addresses the Bank Insur-
ance Fund.
2. These changes, which began to emerge or accelerate principally in the mid-1970s, are
largely attributable to high rates of inflation, interest rate volatility, and advances in technology,
such as developments in information processing and transmission. For a brief overview of the
changes, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS XVIII 9-12 (1991) [hereinafter
TREASURY REPORT].
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statutory restrictions on both product and geographic expansion, bank-
ing organizations, unlike their non-bank competitors, have not had the
flexibility to respond fully to these changes. As a result, banks have ex-
perienced substantial losses of business to non-bank competitors, reduced
profitability, and a corresponding decrease in their ability to attract new
capital.
The question facing policy makers and the banking industry is what,
rather than whether, corrective action is warranted. The need for broad
reform to protect the deposit insurance fund is clear. Although a
number of issues associated with reform merit debate and thoughtful
consideration, the most important for the deposit insurer is financial
safety and soundness. In addition to identifying and evaluating the po-
tential safety-and-soundness benefits associated with relaxing or eliminat-
ing existing product and geographic restrictions, the deposit insurer must
be concerned with whether such reform, on balance, would enhance the
stability of the banking system or expose the system and the insurance
fund to excessive risk.
The safety-and-soundness benefits associated with reform are substan-
tial, as are the safety-and-soundness risks. It is believed, however, that
the risks can be addressed adequately by appropriate safeguards carefully
tailored to specific concerns.
In light of the risks and the importance of the banking system in the
nation's economy, great care should be taken to ensure that entry by
banking organizations into new product and geographic areas is not per-
mitted until sufficient safeguards are in place. Moreover, because it is
impossible to anticipate fully all of the ramifications of extensive reform
of the system, relaxation of existing restraints should be phased in on an
orderly, progressive basis.
Past experience has taught that broadening the powers available to in-
sured depository institutions cannot be accomplished safely absent in-
creased supervisory oversight.3 Federal bank regulatory agencies,
including the FDIC, will need additional supervisory authority and re-
3. During the early 1980s, federal legislation granted broad new powers to savings and loan
associations and to other thrift institutions. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institu-
tions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469. However, this legislation did not provide
adequate safeguards, such as increased supervisory powers, to protect against excessive safety-and.
soundness risk. On balance, the new powers adversely affected the financial health of the savings
and loan industry, as well as the federal deposit insurance fund that covered savings and loans at the
time.
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sources to monitor individual banks in connection with their involvement
with new activities.
Despite existing restrictions, banking organizations have been able to
expand to a limited extent into new product and geographic areas. Even
absent statutory reform, such expansion can be expected to continue. In
their effort to compete more effectively, banks will attempt to keep pace
with developments in the marketplace. A carefully considered, cohesive
reform policy is needed to provide a rational framework within which
banks can expand more freely, subject to the safeguards necessary to en-
sure the continued stability of the banking system and to avoid unneces-
sary losses to the deposit insurance fund.
II. SAFETY-AND-SOUNDNESS BENEFITS OF REFORM
The primary goal for any statutory scheme governing the nation's
banking system should be a safe, workable system, free of unnecessary
governmental restraints. Unnecessary regulation adds to the cost of do-
ing business, impedes competition and economic efficiency, and ulti-
mately can affect the health and vitality of the system. Clearly, some
restrictions are needed. The difficult task is identifying those restrictions.
Existing limitations on geographic and product expansion by banking
firms have had substantial adverse effects. Geographic restrictions have
seriously impeded the ability of banking organizations to enhance their
financial stability through geographic diversity and to provide greater
customer convenience. Although these restrictions have been loosened
substantially in recent years, the available means of geographic expansion
are often the most costly or are limited to the same region in which the
banking organization already operates, thereby reducing the benefits to
be achieved by such expansion.
Existing restrictions on expansion into new product areas similarly
have impeded banking organizations' efforts to compete with other finan-
cial services firms in a rapidly changing economic environment. Non-
bank financial services firms, free of such constraints, have been better
able to meet customer needs by creating new products and product pack-
ages.' Today, non-banking firms offer alternatives for most banking
products or services, often at lower cost.
4. For example, securities firms offer asset management accounts that combine such compo-
nents as money market mutual funds, "checking" (funds withdrawal and deposit) features, credit
cards, personal loans, and securities brokerage. Such accounts are available through the local offices
of regional and national firms.
1991]
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Relaxation of these restrictions would allow banking organizations to
achieve greater product and geographic diversity, spreading the risk of
financial loss over broader areas and reducing the possibility that
problems in one area could cause bank insolvency. It also would permit
greater flexibility to meet competition from other financial services prov-
iders, or to initiate competition, by adapting existing offerings or intro-
ducing new products or product packages that are more responsive to
customers' changing needs. Providing banking organizations the oppor-
tunity to offer non-banking products that have synergies with banking
products would better enable them to take advantage of applicable econ-
omies of scale or scope, improve their economic efficiency, and allow
them to offer the products at a lower cost.
By providing banking organizations with the flexibility to operate
more efficiently and to compete more effectively, geographic and product
reform should enhance profitability and promote the attractiveness of the
industry for new capital. The increased availability of additional capital
would contribute further to the safety and soundness of the banking sys-
tem.5 Improved stability and vitality of the system would, in turn, re-
duce the risk of loss to the federal deposit insurance fund.6
III. SAFETY-AND-SOUNDNESS ASPECTS OF GEOGRAPHIC REFORM
Federal statutory restrictions on geographic expansion by banking or-
ganizations take two basic forms: limitations on branching by national
banks, and limitations on interstate acquisitions of banks by bank hold-
ing companies. As to both, Congress effectively has left to the states the
decision of how much expansion to permit.
Under section 7 of the McFadden Act,7 national banks are permitted
to branch only to the extent that state banks are permitted to branch
5. The importance of banking reform is summarized in the following statement by L. William
Seidman, Chairman of the FDIC: "the banking system must prosper in order to be safe and sound,
and prosperity can be achieved only if banks are free to attract capital and compete effectively at
home and abroad." GAO Report: Bank Powers: Activities of Securities Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1990). Broad reform is
needed, Mr. Seidman stated, for banks to be able to compete effectively and to prosper. Id.
6. Other potential benefits of reform, beyond the safety-and-soundness benefits identified
above, include greater customer convenience, product innovation, and increased competition in mar-
kets into which banking organizations are permitted to expand.
7. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988)).
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under state law.' Similarly, section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 ("BHC Act")9 permits bank holding companies to acquire
out-of-state banks only if the target bank's state law expressly authorizes
such acquisitions."° One obvious way to relax federal restrictions would
be to permit national bank branching or holding company bank acquisi-
tions independently of, or with less reliance on, state law. For example,
national banks could be permitted to branch statewide, or even nation-
wide." Bank holding companies could be permitted to acquire banks
anywhere in the country. 2
Meanwhile, state law restrictions on bank expansion have been greatly
liberalized over the past decade. In 1939, eighteen states permitted state-
wide branching, while nine others limited their banks to a single office
(known as "unit banking").' 3 These numbers changed very little until
the 1980s.' 4 By 1990, however, thirty-six states allowed statewide
branching to some extent, and the number of unit banking states had
declined to two. '5 The 1980s also saw a dramatic increase in the number
of states permitting bank acquisitions by out-of-state holding compa-
nies. 6 As of August 1990, all but three states had authorized entry by
8. Prior to enactment of the McFadden Act, national banks were not authorized to branch.
First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri ex reL Barrett, 263 U.S. 640 (1924) (national banks limited to one
office, with no implied power to branch). The McFadden Act, as enacted in 1927, permitted na-
tional banks to branch within their home city, town, or village, provided that state banks could do
so. This authority was expanded in 1933 to permit branching "at any point in the State," consistent
with state law governing state banks. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90.
9. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133, 134-35 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1988)). Section 3(d)
is commonly referred to as the "Douglas Amendment."
10. The Douglas Amendment was itself amended in 1982 to exempt from its restrictions certain
emergency acquisitions involving failed or failing banks. See § 118(c) of the Garn-St. Germain De-
pository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1479. The emergency acquisi-
tion procedure addressed by the amendment was added to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act as new
§ 13(f) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1988)), by § 116 of the Garn-St. Germain Act.
11. In its recent report recommending reform of the banking system, the Treasury Department
calls for new authority for national banks to branch into any state in which their holding companies
could acquire a bank. In addition, the report recommends that the Douglas Amendment be re-
pealed, with a three-year delayed effective date. TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at 51-52.
12. The BHC Act does not impose geographic restrictions on bank holding company ownership
of non-bank subsidiaries.
13. Mengle, The Case for Interstate Branch Banking, ECONOMIC REVIEW, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at
3, 7 (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Maine, in 1975, was the first state after enactment of the Douglas Amendment to adopt a
statute authorizing bank acquisitions by out-of-state holding companies. P. ROSE, THE INTERSTATE
BANKING REVOLUTION 55-56 (1989). In 1982, Massachusetts and New York enacted their own
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out-of-state holding companies. 1 7 Of the forty-eight states (including the
District of Columbia) permitting entry, thirty-four do so on a nationwide
basis, while entry into the remaining fourteen states is limited to holding
companies owning banks within the same region.' 8
Notwithstanding these important state initiatives, major barriers to ge-
ographic expansion still remain. For example, many states still impose
substantial intrastate branching limitations,' 9 which apply to national
banks under the McFadden Act, and national banks are generally be-
lieved to lack authority to branch across state lines.2 0 Also, the differing
approaches adopted by states that permit interstate expansion by bank
holding companies have resulted in a patchwork of disparate rules. In
addition to the confusion created by this disparity, such rules often pre-
clude entry. For example, due to regional limitations imposed by a
number of states, a New England bank holding company seeking to ex-
pand into another part of the country with a different type of economy
would not be permitted to acquire a bank in the Sunbelt (Florida, Geor-
gia, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, North Carolina, or Arkansas)
or in some Western or Midwestern states.2' Moreover, many states pro-
hibit de novo entry (through formation of a new bank) or entry through
interstate statutes. The New York statute permitted entry by banking organizations nationwide, but
the Massachusetts law limited entry to banking organizations from a six-state northeastern region
(which did not include New York). Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted regional statutes in
1983. State authority geographically to limit entry in this manner was upheld by the Supreme
Court, in a challenge to the Federal Reserve Board's approval of interstate acquisitions under the
Massachusetts and Connecticut statutes, in Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159
(1985). Following this decision, formation of regional compacts moved forward.
17. See Interstate Banking Laws: State by State, BANK EXPANSION REP., Aug. 20, 1990, at 7-
10. These actions by state legislatures to approve interstate entry have been attributed both to lobby-
ing at the state level by bankers unsuccessful with Congress and to the perception that such action
would aid economic development in the state. See ROSE, supra note 16, at 14, 56.
18. See BANK EXPANSION REP., supra note 17.
19. While Congress presumably could grant broader branching authority to state banks, it is far
more likely to leave such policy making to the states. The dual banking system, under which state-
chartered banks are regulated primarily by state law and national banks are regulated by federal
law-an arrangement that has existed successfully for well over a century-would be seriously un-
dermined by broad federal control of state bank branching.
20. The prevailing view is that the McFadden Act does not authorize interstate branching by
national banks (the express authority is for branching "at any point in the state" (emphasis added)).
See, eg., Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (when the BHC Act
was enacted in 1956, "interstate branch banking was already prohibited by the McFadden Act")
(dictum). In any event, interstate branching generally is not authorized by state law. See UNITED
STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS, INTERSTATE BANKING 1990: A GUIDE TO STATE
LAWS (1990).
21. See BANK EXPANSION REP., suPRA note 17.
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acquisition of a bank in existence for less than a minimum period of time
(most commonly, five years).22 Some states permit nationwide entry
only where certain special conditions, such as job creation and commu-
nity reinvestment requirements, are met.23
Thus, banking organizations still face significant geographic impedi-
ments to diversification and effective competition with other financial
services firms. There is good reason to expect that, absent federal legisla-
tion relaxing these restrictions in a cohesive and systematic manner, per-
sistent piecemeal efforts to chip away at the existing law through
regulatory approvals and litigation will continue.24 Adoption of legisla-
tion reflecting a considered, unified approach to geographic reform is by
far the preferable alternative.
Opposition to the relaxation of geographic restrictions appears to be
founded more on socio-political concerns, such as the possibility of in-
creased nationwide concentration of banking resources, 25 than on safety-
and-soundness considerations. The perceived concern that seems most
22. Id.
23. Id
24. For example, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has permitted national
banks in several states to establish branches at locations where state banks would not be permitted to
branch, based on a rationale involving the definition of "State bank" in the McFadden Act, 12
U.S.C. § 36(h) (1989), the "banking" activities of state savings associations under state law, and state
branching authority that is broader for savings associations than for banks. This rationale has been
upheld by several federal courts. See, eg., Department of Banking & Consumer Fin. v. Clarke, 809
F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987). Another initiative to increase geographic
flexibility involved the so-called "non-bank bank." This phenomenon was based on the pre-1987
definition of "bank" in the BHC Act as an institution that both accepts demand deposits and engages
in the business of making commercial loans. An institution that met only one of these criteria was
not a bank for BHC Act purposes, even though it might be the functional equivalent of a bank. See
Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). Such institutions therefore could
be acquired by an out-of-state bank holding company without regard to the Douglas Amendment.
This two-pronged definition was amended by the Competitive Equality in Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA), Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101(aX1), 101 Stat. 554 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1988)), in
order to close what was commonly referred to as the "non-bank bank loophole."
25. This seems to be more of a socio-political concern than an economic one since few banking
products are likely to involve a truly "national," rather than a smaller or larger, market. There is,
however, a safety-and-soundness aspect to this concern. If increased consolidation results in a few
dominant banking organizations, failure of any one could pose a significant threat to the stability of
the banking system. At present, the level of concentration of banking assets in the United States is
low: the four largest U.S. bank holding companies control less than 15% of the nation's total com-
mercial banking assets. Some increase in concentration should not cause significant concern. How-
ever, if a meaningful likelihood that geographic reform would result in harmful levels of
concentration develops, the better approach is not to reject reform but rather to adopt specific safe-
guards to address that concern. For example, one approach proposed in the past, and noted here
solely for the purpose of illustration, would impose size limitations on acquisitions involving banks.
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directly related to safety and soundness is the possibility of bank failures
due to an inability to survive in a more competitive environment. To the
extent this concern is warranted, it must be weighed against the substan-
tial safety-and-soundness benefits of geographic reform. Efforts to en-
hance the financial health and viability of the banking system and the
deposit insurance fund should not be rejected because of a possible ad-
verse impact on a limited number of banks.26
IV. SAFETY-AND-SOUNDNESS ASPECTS OF PRODUCT REFORM
Proposals for product reform have focused primarily on the restric-
tions imposed under the Glass-Steagall Act27 and the Bank Holding
Company Act.28 Stated broadly, the Glass-Steagall Act prohibits banks
from engaging in, or becoming affiliated with entities engaged in, securi-
ties activities.29 The BHC Act, by limiting the non-banking activities of
bank holding companies to those that are "closely related to banking,"
Another possible approach, applicable to the extent concerns over increased concentration actually
do involve market power, would be to implement safeguards through antitrust enforcement policy.
26. As discussed above, one of the primary benefits of geographic reform is the opportunity for
banking organizations to achieve geographic diversity and spread their risk of financial loss among
areas with varying types of local economies, customers, and financial services needs. The value of
this benefit to the banking system as a whole is likely to exceed the potential harm of failures among
banks unable to survive increased competition. A bank should not lack the ability to compete just
because of its size. There is substantial evidence that larger banks do not have significant efficiency
advantages over smaller banks, and that the latter can compete very well with the former. See, e.g.,
Benston, What Does Experience Tell Us About Competition, in INTERSTATE BANKING: STRATEGIES
FOR A NEW ERA, 137, 143 (1985). Indeed, larger banks have been found to be less efficient than
smaller banks. Id. Thus, it is probable that the banks most at risk from increased competition
would be those already experiencing difficulty. Since such banks might fail even in the absence of
additional geographic reform, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of this perceived problem. De-
posit insurance exists because of the expectation that some banks will fail. The more important
concern is the financial health of the banking system as a whole.
27. This is the popular name of four sections of the Banking Act of 1933: §§ 16, 20, 21, and 32,
ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, and 194 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), as amended, Pub.
L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 2036, 2037 (1990), 377, 378, and 78) (1988).
28. Section 4 of the BHC Act (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1988)), addresses bank holding
company ownership or control of non-banking entities.
29. Section 16 provides that, except with respect to certain government-related securities, na-
tional banks are prohibited from underwriting securities, and are permitted to purchase and sell
securities only "without recourse, solely upon the order of, and for the account of, customers."
(Section 16 is made applicable to state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System by
§ 5(c), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988)). Section 20 generally prohibits affiliation between banks that arc
members of the Federal Reserve System ("member" banks) and entities "engaged principally in the
issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities. Section 21 bars any firm
engaged in "the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing ... securities" from also
engaging in the business of accepting deposits; and section 32 prohibits director, management, or
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forces separation of banking and nonfinancial commercial activities."
Banking organizations have sought a wide range of securities powers,
including authority to engage in full-service brokerage, and to underwrite
and deal in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities, com-
mercial paper, and instruments backed by consumer receivables. Other
proposed powers have included insurance brokerage and underwriting
and real estate brokerage, investment, and development. Despite existing
restrictions,3 banking firms are permitted to engage in such activities to
a limited extent. This authority comes from narrow grants of power in
federal statutes32 and from initiatives at the state level.33 In addition,
employee overlap between member banks and entities "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities.
30. Section 4(cX8) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988), permits a bank holding
company to own or control companies engaged in activities determined by the Federal Reserve
Board, by order or regulation, "to be so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks
as to be a proper incident thereto..." In making such a determination, the Board is required to
consider the potential public benefits and the possible adverse effects of participation in the activity
by an affiliate of a bank holding company. Specific factors listed for Board consideration include
competitive effects, efficiency, conflicts of interest, and unsound banking practices. Activities that
have been approved by the Board by regulation are enumerated at 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1990).
31. For a historical perspective on the restrictions imposed under the Glass-Steagall Act and
the BHC Act, see FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY, 17-
45 (1987) [hereinafter MANDATE FOR CHANGE].
32. For example, although § 4(cX8) of the BHC Act, as amended by § 601 of the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988), generally deems the
provision of "insurance as a principal, agent, or broker" to be "not closely related to banking" (and
therefore not a permissible activity for non-bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies), it does set
out some limited exceptions that permit, inter alia, insurance agency activity in communities with
populations not exceeding 5,000. National banks similarly have express power to act as insurance
agents in small towns. See 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1988). (For a discussion regarding the proper citation for
§ 92, which has been omitted from the U.S. Code since 1952, see Abbott, Scott & Barrett, Banks and
Insurance: An Update, 43 Bus. LAW. 1005, 1015 n.32 (1988)).
33. Banks chartered under state law are sometimes granted powers not available to national
banks. For example, according to FDIC data, approximately 26 states permit their banks to engage
in full-service securities brokerage, approximately 23 permit equity participation in real estate, and
approximately 6 permit insurance underwriting and brokerage beyond credit life coverage. The ex-
tent to which state banks may exercise such powers, however, can be affected by federal law. For
example, §§ 16, 20, and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act are applicable to state member banks, and § 21
is applicable to all banks. (Section 21 does not, however, bar non-bank securities activities by affili-
ates or subsidiaries of state non-member banks. Investment Co. Inst. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
606 F. Supp. 683 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd., 815 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
847 (1987)). In addition, the FDIC in 1984 adopted regulations requiring that securities powers
granted to insured state non-member banks under state law be exercised only indirectly, through a
"bona fide subsidiary," rather than by the bank directly. See 12 C.F.R § 337.4 (1990). The FDIC is
currently considering whether similar restrictions would be appropriate for other expanded powers
permitted under state law.
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some increased product flexibility has been achieved through successful
efforts to test the limits of existing federal restrictions.34 As with geo-
graphic restrictions, such efforts surely will continue in the absence of a
systematic approach to product reform.
Safety-and-soundness concerns associated with expanded powers focus
on the possibility that participation in expanded activities would expose
banks to increased risk of financial loss. 35 There are three principal areas
of concern: the possibility that the bank would be legally liable for losses
resulting from the expanded activities; the increased potential for con-
fficts of interest adversely affecting the bank's financial condition; and a
loss in public confidence in the bank due to the financial difficulties of a
34. For example, the OCC has permitted national banks to engage in discount brokerage activi-
ties. See, eg., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Comptroller of the Currency, 577 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C.
1983) (upholding OCC's approval of such activities), aff'd, 758 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986) (on the activities issue). The OCC also has allowed
national banks to combine such services to some extent with investment advisory services. See, e.g.,
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 386 (June 10, 1987), OCC Quarterly Journal, December 1987, at 36,
reprinted in [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,610. The OCC also has
permitted national banks to issue and sell interests in pools of bank assets, such as mortgages
originated by the bank. See, e.g., Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034 (2d. Cir. 1989)
(upholding OCC's decision to permit issuance and sale of securities backed by national bank's mort-
gage loans), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1113 (1990).
Securities activities approved by the Federal Reserve Board on a case-by-case basis under the
BHC Act have included a limited volume of underwriting and dealing in municipal revenue bonds,
mortgage-backed securities, commercial paper, and securities backed by consumer receivables. See
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987) (generally upholding
Board's order approving several applications for such activities), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988).
Other activities approved by the Board have included underwriting and dealing in corporate debt
and equity securities on a limited basis. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d
360 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (denying petition for review of Board's approvals to underwrite and deal in
corporate debt and equity securities). The Board's approvals of these applications, in which the
Board originally limited the activities to five percent of the subsidiary's gross revenues, were based in
part on its interpretation of the term "engaged principally" in § 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. See,
e.g., Citicorp, et al., 73 FED. REs. BULL. 473 (1987) (Board's order of April 30, 1987, approving
several applications to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-backed securities,
and commercial paper). The five percent revenue limit subsequently was increased by the Board to
ten percent. See Fed Raises Section 20 Order Limit to 10 Percent, Allows Affiliate Deals, 53 BANK-
ING REP. (BNA) 372 (Sept. 18, 1989).
For a discussion of such developments, see Kurucza, Ballen & McTaggart, Securities and Invest-
ment Activities of Banks, 43 Bus. LAW 1107 (1988).
35. In addition to safety-and-soundness concerns, other concerns associated with expanded
powers include consumer protection, competitive parity, and resource concentration issues.
Although this Article is not intended to address such issues, it is believed that, as with safety-and-
soundness concerns, the better approach is to identify and adopt safeguards tailored to specific
problems rather than to retain the existing broad prohibitions. The safeguards discussed infra with
regard to safety-and-soundness issues can provide protections in these other areas as well.
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related entity involved in expanded activities.3 6
These are legitimate concerns. Absent protective measures, a broad
grant of new powers could expose the banking system to undue risk and
the deposit insurance fund to excessive losses. The important question,
however, is whether there are feasible safeguards that can limit the risks
to an acceptable level. This standard does not require banks to be totally
immune from all risks associated with expanded powers. The activities
in which banks have engaged traditionally are not risk-free, and contin-
ued confinement to those activities despite the changing market environ-
ment can increase banks' overall risk.37  The primary purpose of
authorizing expanded powers is to reduce overall risk through such
means as diversification and improved efficiency. The more the bank is
insulated from the risks of expanded activities, the more it is also insu-
lated from the benefits. A framework is needed that will provide a work-
able balance between maximizing the benefits to the bank from expanded
activities and minimizing the risks to the banking system and the deposit
insurance fund.
Two basic measures to provide protection from excessive safety-and-
soundness risk have been proposed: legally separating the banking oper-
ation from the expanded activities and imposing restrictions on dealings
between the bank and its affiliates or subsidiaries that engage in expanded
activities. When combined with other protective measures, such as in-
creased supervisory powers, these insulating mechanisms can limit risk
exposure to an acceptable level.
As a general rule, investors in a corporation are liable for the obliga-
tions of the corporation only to the extent of their investment. Limited
liability is based on the theory that the corporation is a separate entity
that exists apart from its shareholders.38 In general, the corporate entity,
and limited liability, will be recognized unless to do so would produce
unjust results or undesirable consequences inconsistent with the "sepa-
36. For discussions of these three types of risk, see, eg., MANDATE FOR CHANGE, supra note
31, at 65-74; UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: INSULATING
BANKS FROM THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXPANDED ACTIVITIES (1987).
37. One way in which risk could increase is if a bank loses business to non-bank competitors
and moves into higher-risk substitutes for that business. For example, as prime corporate borrowers
have turned to commercial paper as a lower-cost alternative to commercial loans obtained from their
banks, the banks have turned to somewhat less creditworthy borrowers as loan customers. MAN-
DATE FOR CHANGE, supra note 31, at 6-7.
38. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTER-
PRISES § 146 (3d ed. 1983).
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rate entity" theory.3 9 "The prevailing rule is that where corporate for-
malities are substantially observed, initial financing reasonably adequate,
and the corporation not formed to evade an existing obligation or a stat-
ute or to cheat or to defraud, even a controlling shareholder enjoys lim-
ited liability."0
In determining whether to recognize or disregard the separateness of
subsidiaries or other affiliated corporations, relevant criteria include the
extent to which there are common directors, officers, and employees; the
extent to which separate stockholders' and directors' meetings are held;
the adequacy of the corporation's financing for operation as a separate
unit; the extent to which the corporation is operated as a separate entity;
the extent to which separate books and accounts are kept; and the extent
to which the affiliated corporations are presented to, and perceived by,
the public as separate business entities.41 Where such criteria support the
corporate separateness of a bank and its affiliates or subsidiaries, the risk
that the bank would be deemed liable for the obligations of the affiliates
or subsidiaries is minimized.4 2
Legal separation does not eliminate the incentives that the banking
organization might have to use bank resources to benefit a non-bank affil-
iate. Even if the bank were not legally liable for the obligations of a
related entity, it might choose to assist the entity voluntarily. Intercom-
pany interaction that is financially detrimental to the bank can increase
its risk of failure. Examples of interaction raising such conflict-of-inter-
39. Id. Where the corporation is merely the "alter ego" of a person, it may be disregarded. 1
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (C. Keating & G.
O'Gradney rev. perm. ed. 1990). The rationale for this "alter ego" doctrine is that the law will not
recognize the corporation as a separate entity if the actions of the shareholders or the corporations
themselves belie separateness. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, eg., HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 38, § 148; PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, RE-
SPONSIBILIrY OF THE CORPORATE PARENT FOR ACTIVITIES OF A SUBSIDIARY 18-22 (1987).
42. The FDIC has applied the concept of legal separation in its rule requiring that certain
securities activities permitted to insured state non-member banks under state law be performed only
through a "bona fide subsidiary" of the bank and not by the bank directly. See 12 C.F.R. § 337.4
(1990). A "bona fide subsidiary" must be adequately capitalized, be physically separate and distinct
in its operations from the operation of the bank, maintain separate accounting and other corporate
records, observe separate formalities such as separate directors' meetings and not share common
officers with the bank, conduct its business pursuant to independent policies and procedures
designed to inform customers and prospective customers of the subsidiary of certain "separateness"
circumstances (including the information that the subsidiary is a separate organization from the
bank), and maintain separate employees who are compensated by the subsidiary. Id. In addition, a
majority of the board of directors of the subsidiary must consist of persons who are neither directors
nor officers of the bank. Id.
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est concerns are bank loans to financially troubled non-bank affiliates,
purchase by the bank of low-quality assets from an affiliate, and bank
purchase of securities being underwritten by an affiliate.
Safeguards against this kind of risk already exist. Sections 23A and
23B of the Federal Reserve Act4 3 impose strict limitations on transac-
tions between a member bank and its affiliates. Section 23A covers,
among other transactions, loans to affiliates, purchases of assets from an
affiliate, investment in affiliate-issued securities, and acceptance of securi-
ties issued by an affiliate as collateral on loans to third parties. Further-
more, the total amount of such transactions with any affiliate is limited to
ten percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus, and to twenty percent
for transactions with all affiliates in the aggregate. Section 23A also re-
quires that extensions of credit by a bank to an affiliate be collateralized
fully, and that all covered transactions be consistent with safe and sound
banking practices. Section 23B supplements these limitations, further re-
quiring that all covered transactions, as well as certain additional trans-
actions, be at arm's length. The additional transactions include sales of
securities and other assets to an affiliate, the payment of money or the
provision of services to an affiliate, or transactions with third parties that
involve an affiliate.
Additional measures might be needed in connection with product re-
form to supplement these existing safeguards. For example, operating
subsidiaries of a bank, not included in the definition of "affiliate" for pur-
poses of sections 23A and 23B, are not covered by those provisions.'
Applying similar restrictions to transactions involving the bank and its
non-bank subsidiaries might be advisable, particularly regarding subsidi-
aries engaging in expanded activities.
The third main concern about exposing the bank to increased risk in-
volves a possible public perception that the financial difficulties of a non-
bank affiliate or subsidiary of the bank would have an adverse financial
effect on the bank. Such a perception could result in a run on the bank,
or the bank might, to its financial detriment, come to the aid of the trou-
43. Section 23A was added to the Federal Reserve Act by § 13 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48
Stat. 162, 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1988)). Section 23B was added by CEBA § 102(a), 101
Stat. 554, 564 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1988)). Both sections are made applicable to state
non-member banks by 12 U.S.C. § 18280) (1988).
44. The FDIC has, by regulation, imposed such restrictions with respect to certain securities
subsidiaries of insured state non-member banks. See 12 CFR § 337.4 (1990).
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bled entity in an effort to protect the interests of the bank or those of a
common parent company.
Legal separation of the bank and non-bank activities and restrictions
on intercompany transactions guard against this "market perception"
risk. Elements of legal separation-such as separate offices and employ-
ees, and procedures designed to alert the public to the firms' separate
corporate existences-are particularly helpful in this regard. Another
measure that merits consideration is requiring written disclosure by the
bank to customers purchasing products or services of a non-bank affili-
ate. The disclosure could inform customers that the bank is merely act-
ing as an agent in making the product or service available, that the firm
actually providing the product or service is a separate entity from the
bank, and that the product or service is not covered by federal deposit
insurance.
In developing a framework that balances the safety-and-soundness
risks and benefits of expanded powers, it is not clear that it is necessary
or desirable to require that all expanded activities be separated from the
bank through non-bank subsidiaries of a parent holding company. As
suggested above, permitting expanded activities to be conducted in an
operating non-bank subsidiary of the bank, or even in a separate depart-
ment within the bank, has advantages. Profits earned by the non-bank
subsidiary or the department would benefit the bank directly, and the
subsidiary or department could be sold in order to aid a financially trou-
bled bank or to satisfy claims against an insolvent bank. Although these
benefits might be available indirectly to the bank if the non-banking ac-
tivities were conducted through a separate subsidiary of the same parent
holding company, they would not be of the same value to the bank.
Moreover, expanded activities would not be available to independent
banks not part of a holding company structure, and forming such a
structure would involve significant costs. There are also disadvantages
to the direct bank subsidiary and department arrangements, including a
lesser degree of risk insulation for the banking operation. Considerations
relevant in determining what expanded activities could be permitted to
the bank directly or through a non-bank subsidiary include the degree of
risk associated with the activity and how closely related the activity is to
traditional banking activities.45
45. Another consideration, which is not wholly a safety-and-soundness issue, is whether the
activity is consistent with the purposes of federal deposit insurance and thus one appropriately cov-
ered by the deposit insurance "safety net." If not, it should not be permitted within the bank.
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In addition to the basic safeguards discussed above, other measures
can be adopted to protect against excessive safety-and-soundness risk.
These measures include requirements concerning capital investments in
entities engaging in expanded activities, and grants of additional supervi-
sory authority to bank regulators.
Adequate capitalization is an important element in achieving legal sep-
aration of the banking and non-banking operations. Adequate capitaliza-
tion of the non-banking operation is also important in minimizing the
possibility that the bank would need to provide financial assistance to a
troubled non-bank affiliate or subsidiary. Non-banking entities engaged
in a regulated industry, such as securities or insurance, should be obli-
gated to meet minimum capitalization requirements for that industry.
Absent such an industry requirement, the entity should be required to
maintain a level of capitalization adequate to the business it conducts.
A related issue is whether, when determining if a bank satisfies estab-
lished capital requirements, calculation of the bank's assets should in-
clude its equity investment in a direct subsidiary engaged in expanded
activities. The more prudent approach would exclude the equity invest-
ment, thus promoting the bank's capital adequacy and enhancing corpo-
rate separateness. An even stricter approach would take the additional
precaution of increasing the capital required of the bank in an amount
equivalent to any loans made by the bank to the subsidiary. This latter
approach effectively would force the subsidiary to go to the market for
funding and, accordingly, would provide an additional incentive for the
subsidiary to remain creditworthy.
Another issue involving capital is whether there should be restrictions
on the portion of a bank's total capital that could be invested in expanded
activities. The greater the portion permitted, the less of its total capital
the bank would have available to invest in the basic banking business.
Finally, a matter that must be resolved before expanding banking
firms' powers in regulated industries is the identity of the primary regula-
tor of a non-bank affiliate. Under the "functional regulation" approach,
bank regulatory agencies would supervise only the bank itself, and proba-
bly the bank holding company. Non-bank affiliates would be supervised
by the appropriate non-bank regulator, such as the Securities and Ex-
change Commission or the state insurance commissioner. Under this ap-
proach, which is likely the most efficient from a regulatory perspective,
banking regulators would need the authority, for such purposes as en-
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forcing the restrictions on intercompany transactions, to monitor both
sides of such transactions.
These are just a few of the tough issues facing policy makers in connec-
tion with banking reform. Resolution of the issues will not be easy, but it
is necessary if meaningful long-term improvements are to be made.
V. CONCLUSION
Extensive reform of the banking system is necessary in order to pre-
serve the stability and viability of the system and to protect the deposit
insurance fund. Such reform can be accomplished without excessive
safety-and-soundness risk, provided adequate safeguards are applied.
Developing a new regulatory framework for the banking system that
achieves an acceptable balance between the benefits and risks will require
careful consideration of many issues and resolution of many difficult pol-
icy questions.
It is time to give serious attention to banking reform. Steps must be
taken soon to begin the process, before the situation reaches a more criti-
cal stage.
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